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Abstract
The existing theoretical literature on fiscal competition has to a large extent ignored
the role of government debt as a determinant of taxes and productive public spend-
ing. We develop a simple model of fiscal competition with government borrowing. If a
default on government debt is no option, initial debt levels play no role in fiscal competi-
tion. This neutrality result is overturned when a default is possible. A government that
is constrained in its borrowing due to a possible default responds optimally by lowering
spending on durable public infrastructure, which in turn induces more aggressive tax
setting. A rise in exogenous firm mobility reinforces the link between legacy debt and
fiscal competition. Our model may help explain the observation that highly indebted
countries in Europe have decreased corporate tax rates over-proportionally. Our model
may also be useful for evaluating decentralization reforms in which the power to tax
firms is devolved to lower levels of governments which differ in their initial debt levels.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis caused substantial increases in government debt levels, raising
concerns about the sustainability of government finances. Governments may need to increase
taxes or cut spending to fix this in the short run. Meanwhile governments at various levels
use lower business taxes and improvements in infrastructure to lure economic activity and
thus raise employment and welfare. These two observations lead to important questions
concerning the interaction between fiscal competition and government debt.
First, does government debt influence fiscal competition among jurisdictions? So far
the theoretical literature on tax competition has mostly ignored public debt levels as a
factor in inter-jurisdictional competition for business investment. One possible reason is
that in the absence of a government default there is no obvious reason why governments
cannot separately optimize public borrowing and fiscal incentives for private investment,
thus precluding any interaction between the initial debt level and business taxes. However,
in the light of public defaults in both developing and developed jurisdictions and a surge in
policy measures designed to limit budget deficits and government debt through fiscal rules,
unconstrained public borrowing is an unrealistic assumption for some jurisdictions.1 In this
paper we argue that initial debt levels do indeed play a role in fiscal competition in case one
relaxes the assumption of unrestricted borrowing.
This leads to our second question: assuming that there are constraints on government
borrowing because a default may happen, does initial (legacy) government debt then lead to
more or less aggressive fiscal competition? Cai & Treisman (2005) argue that asymmetries in
certain jurisdictional characteristics may have a substantial effect on how these jurisdictions
behave in fiscal competition and how they react to an increase in tax base mobility. In
this regard, initial debt levels may constitute an important but so far largely neglected
factor. Highly indebted jurisdictions have less fiscal space for spending on goods like public
infrastructure that make the location more attractive. Jurisdictions may compensate for
this by setting their taxes more aggressively. However, competing against jurisdictions that
generally have lower debt levels and thus better infrastructure may require very low tax
rates of highly indebted jurisdictions which in turn aggravates the fiscal situation.2
The main contribution of this paper is to formally model and to specify the suggested link
between initial government debt and subsequent fiscal competition, taking the possibility of
a government default into account. Moreover, as technological progress and the globalization
of business make firm location choices more flexible, we analyze how an increase in capital
mobility (by loosening firm attachment to a specific jurisdiction) affects the interaction
1By “unconstrained” we mean that the government can borrow as much as it wants at the current interest
rate assuming no default.
2Cursory evidence points to the relevance of this channel. While most governments decreased corporate
tax rates from 2002 to 2012, the cuts tend to be more substantial in countries with high levels of public debt
at the beginning of the period. For example Greece and Cyprus, both highly indebted countries in 2002,
had decreased their corporate tax rates by more than 40 percent by 2012. According to the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators, the debt-to-GDP ratios on the central government level in 2002 were 123
and 159 percent for Greece and Cyprus, respectively.
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between government debt and fiscal competition. Greater capital mobility drives down tax
rates on firms, a direct effect that is well known in the literature. Furthermore, we show
that globalization, in terms of higher firm mobility, tends to reinforce the impact of initial
debt on fiscal competition, which we identify as a novel indirect effect.
Our model also allows us to link the causes of initial public debt levels to its comparative
static effects. In particular, if higher legacy debt is the result of higher government con-
sumption expenditure in the past - and thus less initial public infrastructure - the effects of
legacy debt on fiscal competition are reinforced. Jurisdictions with high initial public debt
and low public infrastructure become even more aggressive in subsequent tax competition.
By contrast, if higher legacy debt is due to spending on initial public infrastructure the
negative effect of legacy debt is mitigated and possibly overturned.
In our analysis we use a simple inter-temporal setting to investigate the interaction
between fiscal competition and government debt. In our two-period and two-jurisdictions
model governments compete for private investment projects by setting tax rates and invest-
ing in public infrastructure. The latter raises the attractiveness of the location for firms
in the following period. In addition, governments can issue debt in the international credit
market. We contribute to the literature on fiscal competition by considering jointly en-
dogenous levels of government debt, productive public infrastructure spending and taxes on
firms. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to relax the assumption of unrestricted
public borrowing in the context of fiscal competition, thereby linking initial debt levels and
government choices in the fiscal competition game.
To highlight the role of a government default in fiscal competition, we first derive a
neutrality result for a situation in which both governments always repay all of the their
existing debt (by assumption or because it is in the interest of the government to repay
the debt when the cost of default is very high). We assume a linear intra-period utility
function, thus, income effects from public debt are not at work3. In this situation no change
in a jurisdiction’s exogenous initial debt level does affect fiscal competition, that is, public
investment in infrastructure and tax rates in subsequent periods are unaffected. There is
no change in the location decision of any firm. Of course, higher initial debt levels affect
borrowing and public consumption good levels in the jurisdiction experiencing the debt
increase and thus are not neutral overall. The logic behind the neutrality result is that, as
long as default is no option, unconstrained public borrowing leads to equalization of marginal
utilities across periods. The choice of public infrastructure investment then boils down to
a comparison of forgone (public good) consumption in the first period versus increased
consumption in the second period because the jurisdiction becomes a more attractive firm
location due to better infrastructure. We also show that higher capital mobility (i.e. less
3Jensen & Toma (1991), by contrast, assume a quasi-linear (within period) utility function and therefore
derive different results without considering a default. In their model, an increase in a jurisdiction’s debt
implies more interest payments subsequently, which lowers public good provision and tends to raise the
jurisdiction’s tax rate. The effect on equilibrium tax rates depends on the nature of the strategic interaction
in tax rates (strategic complementarity or substitutes).
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attachment of firms to a specific jurisdiction) generally decreases equilibrium tax rates, which
is standard in the literature.
We then allow for a government default. The possibility of default limits how much
foreign creditors are willing to lend. We ask whether and how changes in the (exogenous)
initial debt level of a jurisdiction affect subsequent borrowing and fiscal competition. Here,
the marginal utilities of consumption are not equalized across periods through government
borrowing and hence the cost of public infrastructure depends on the initial debt. A high
level of legacy debt increases the marginal cost of spending on public infrastructure. Govern-
ments optimally respond to a higher initial debt burden by reducing public investment. This
in turn triggers a further adjustment: to compensate for the resulting disadvantage in the
fiscal competition game due to worse public infrastructure the government imposes a lower
tax on firms, while taxes in the other jurisdiction may rise, thus leading to tax divergence.
In other words, governments with good public infrastructure can afford to impose higher
tax rates ceteris paribus, and vice versa. We show that a rise in capital mobility reinforces
the mechanism. Less attachment of firms to a specific location makes the negative effect of
higher legacy debt on public investment and taxes stronger because it decreases the gov-
ernment’s ability to tax firms and makes it more responsive to burdens from existing debt
repayments.
There is a large body of research on inter-jurisdictional competition in taxes (see Keen &
Konrad, 2013) and public infrastructure investment (e.g. Noiset, 1995; Bucovetsky, 2005), as
well as, on the interaction between these two policy instruments (e.g. Wilson, 2005; Petchey
& Shapiro, 2009; Hauptmeier et al., 2012; Matsumoto, 1998). It is also common both to
separately analyze the evolution of government debt (e.g. Barro, 1979; Acharya & Rajan,
2013) and to incorporate it into comprehensive fiscal policy models (e.g. Battaglini & Coate,
2008). However, while empirical findings suggest some interaction (e.g. Winner, 2005) there
is hardly any theoretical work that looks at the interplay between fiscal competition and
public debt.
There are two exceptions. Arcalean (2015) analyzes the effects of financial liberalization
on capital and labor taxes as well as budget deficits in a multi-country world where countries
are linked through capital mobility. Financial liberalization works similar to an increase in
firm mobility in our setup. In contrast to our analysis, he focuses on endogenous budget
deficits that change due to financial liberalization because permanently lower tax rates on
capital due to more intensive tax competition lead to higher capital accumulation in the
future. This in turn makes it attractive for the median worker to bring forward the higher
benefits of capital taxation through government debt. The mechanism works at the early
stages of financial liberalization when capital taxes are relatively high, but not when they
are already low due to advanced liberalization.
The other exception is the contribution by Jensen & Toma (1991) who develop a two-
period, two-jurisdiction model. They assume that in the first period each government chooses
the optimal level of debt taking into account any negative effects of repayment demands in
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the tax competition game. When governments have to balance the budget in the second
period, a higher level of first-period debt leads to a higher level of taxation and a lower
level of public good provision in that jurisdiction. In the other jurisdictions, either a higher
or a lower tax rate is set depending on whether tax rates are strategic complements or
substitutes.4 The present paper differs from this setting in three important aspects: First,
we allow for a default on government debt which endogenously limits the maximum level of
public debt. Second, we introduce public infrastructure investment as an additional fiscal
instrument that interacts with the setting of taxes. Finally, we assume a linear within-period
utility function, which allows us to abstract from the intra-period transmission mechanism
identified by Jensen & Toma (1991). Our approach is more tractable in an otherwise more
complex model and highlights the novel inter-temporal mechanism through which legacy
debt operates.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model framework. We
then proceed to the equilibrium analysis in Section 3 which also contains the main results.
Section 4 provides the conclusion.
2 The Model
We start with a brief overview of the model. The world consists of two jurisdictions, i = 1, 2,
linked through the mobility of a tax base. The tax base is the outcome of the location deci-
sions of a continuum of firms and generates private benefits such as employment and income.
In addition, revenues from taxing the base are used by the government for spending on a
public consumption good, a public infrastructure good, and debt repayment. Better infras-
tructure makes a jurisdiction more attractive, while taxes work in the opposite direction.
The economy lasts for two periods t = 1, 2. Both jurisdictions start with an initial (legacy)
debt level bi0 and issue new debt in the first period in an international credit market at a
given interest rate. We pay particular attention to a government’s willingness to repay its
debt in period 2, which endogenously limits the maximum available credit.
The government is assumed to be benevolent in the sense that each government max-
imizes a linear combination of the number of firms in its jurisdiction and the level of the
public consumption good, in line with many models of fiscal competition. There are two
inter-temporal decisions for a government to be made in period 1: the level of borrowing and
the spending on public infrastructure. The latter is a long term decision in the sense that
public investment is costly in period 1, but carries benefits only in period 2. This assump-
tion captures the durable good nature of infrastructure projects. We consider a fiscal policy
game between the two governments without commitment, that is, governments choose fiscal
policy in each period non-cooperatively and there is no commitment in period 1 for fiscal
policies in period 2.
4An interesting empirical application for this model in the case of interactions in borrowing decisions can
be found in Borck et al. (2015).
4
Fiscal competition has two dimensions: tax rate competition in periods 1 and 2, where
governments set a uniform tax on each firm in their location, and competition in infras-
tructure spending which determines the attractiveness of a location for private investment
in period 2 only. We characterize the equilibrium of this game and investigate comparative
statics with respect to the level of legacy debt and the extent of firm mobility. The former
features prominently due to the recent financial and economic crisis. The latter mirrors the
increasing extent of footloose capital .
2.1 Firms
We begin the description of the model with the location of the tax base, which follows a
simple Hotelling (1929) approach.5 In each period there is a continuum of firms that choose
a jurisdiction to locate in. Firms are heterogeneous in terms of their exogenous bias towards
one of the two jurisdictions, which is captured by the firm-specific parameter α ∈ [0, 1].
Firms can switch their investment location between periods at no cost. For the time being
we, therefore, describe a generic decision problem of a firm without time reference. A firm
of type α receives a net benefit ϕi in jurisdiction i = 1, 2 given by
ϕ1 = ψ + αν + ρq1 − τ1,
ϕ2 = ψ + (1− α) ν + ρq2 − τ2,
(1)
respectively. The terms ψ+αν and ψ+ (1− α) ν represent the exogenous returns received.
The general return ψ is assumed to be sufficiently positive so that overall returns ϕi are
non-negative. Therefore, the firm always prefers locating in one of the two jurisdictions
rather than not carrying out an investment at all. The second component of the private
return is the firm-specific return in each jurisdiction weighted by ν > 0. The parameter
ν allows us to capture the strength of the exogenous component relative to the policy
induced component. Variation in ν changes the degree of fiscal competition, which we
analyze below in more detail. The overall return to investment in a jurisdiction i further
increases when the jurisdiction has a stock of public infrastructure in place at level qi ≥ 0.
The effectiveness of public infrastructure is captured by the parameter ρ ≥ 0 and is not
firm-specific.6 Finally, the uniform tax τi reduces the return. We assume that the tax is
not firm-specific, perhaps because the government cannot determine a firm’s type and for
administrative reasons cannot choose a more sophisticated tax function.7
The marginal firm is indifferent between the two locations for the given policy parameters.
5Our model shares some features with classical models of tax competition as, for example, Zodrow &
Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). Our approach is analytically simpler to handle which is crucial in
the in the presence of many government instruments including public infrastructure and government debt.
6In principle, we could interact the firm-specific component and the effectiveness of public infrastructure.
This would lead to a less tractable framework, however.
7We model the location decision of investment rather than the size of particular investment projects such
that the uniform, average tax is the relevant measure for a firm’s decision making.
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A firm of type α invests in jurisdiction 1 if ϕ1 ≥ ϕ2, which defines a threshold
α˜ =
1
2
+
τ1 − τ2 + ρ (q2 − q1)
2ν
,
such that a firm invests in jurisdiction 1 whenever α ≥ α˜. Note that the value of the marginal
firm’s type is a linear function of the tax and public infrastructure differentials, which is a
convenient property. In addition, the sensitivity of the threshold with respect to both tax
rates and infrastructure spending depends on the parameter ν. Higher values of ν represent
less sensitivity.
Let α ∈ [0, 1] be uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Under the assumption that
the marginal firm is interior, that is α˜ ∈ (0, 1)8, the number of firms in each jurisdiction is
given by N1 = 1− α˜ and N2 = α˜ or, more generally,
Ni (τi, τj , qi, qj) =
1
2
+
ρ4qi −∆τi
2ν
, (2)
where 4qi = qi − qjand ∆τi = τi − τj . Firms split evenly between the two jurisdictions
when both policies are symmetric across jurisdictions.
2.2 Governments
The government in each jurisdiction takes several decisions in each period. In both periods,
it sets a uniform tax τit and provides a public consumption good git, which can be produced
by transforming one unit of the private good into one unit of the public consumption good.
In the first period, the government also decides on public infrastructure investment mit, and
the level of newly issued debt bi1. If the government honors the debt contract, bi1 is repaid
in period 2.
Public investment raises the existing stock of public infrastructure qit. In each period a
share δ ∈ [0, 1] of qit depreciates such that the law of motion for qit is denoted by
qit = (1− δ) qit−1 +mit−1. (3)
In our two-period model, jurisdictions are endowed with an exogenous level of public infras-
tructure qi0 = q¯i in period 1. Of course, a jurisdiction’s level of public infrastructure may
be linked to the existing level of government debt in that jurisdiction. We show below how
such a link affects our result. The cost for public infrastructure investment is denoted by c,
which is an increasing function of mi and strictly convex with c′ (mi) > 0, c′′ (mi) > 0.9
Using git and bit to denote the quantity of the public consumption good provided and the
8Similar to Hindriks et al. (2008) we make this assumption to avoid the less interesting case of a concen-
tration of all investment in one of the two jurisdictions which would be the case if α˜ was outside the unit
interval.
9To simplify notation, we have suppressed the time subscript in mi since it is effectively only chosen in
period 1.
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debt level, respectively, in jurisdiction i in period t, the period-specific budget constraints
for the government in i = 1, 2 can be stated as follows:
gi1 = τi1Ni1 − c− (1 + r) bi0 + bi1 (4)
gi2 = τi2Ni2 − (1 + r) bi1. (5)
Government borrowing takes place in the international credit market at a constant interest
rate r. The budget constraints shown above assume for the time being that government
debt is repaid and therefore no default is considered. In our subsequent analysis we pay
attention to the possibility of default.10
Each government is assumed to maximize the discounted benefit arising from attracting
firms and government spending on a public consumption good according to the following
specification:
U i = h1 (ui1) + βh2(ui2) = h1 (Ni1 + γgi1) + βh2 (Ni2 + γgi2) . (6)
We think of (6) as the utility function of a representative citizen who benefits from attracting
firms or capital because it generates income and employment. Here, we simply use the
number of firms in jurisdiction i, Ni, as an indicator of this benefit. In addition, attracting
firms increases the tax base and generates higher tax revenues. The marginal benefit of the
public good, γ > 1, implicitly determines the relative weight attached to the private benefit
and public consumption. The linear structure of the within-period utility function is in line
with earlier literature (e.g. Brueckner, 1998) in order to solve for Nash tax rates explicitly.
This assumption differs from Jensen & Toma (1991) who assume a strictly concave function
for the benefit of the public good (within the function h2). As mentioned earlier this is done
for tractability reasons and for showing the novel mechanism at work in our model. β is the
discount factor which we assume to equal 11+r .
The inter-temporal structure of the utility function assumes that the functions h1 and
h2 are concave, and at least one of them is strictly concave. We assume this for h1, such
that h′1 > 0, h′2 > 0, h′′1 < 0, h′′2 ≤ 0. Below, we will consider two special cases in more
detail: i) the functions h1 and h2 are identical and strictly concave (e.g. logarithmic), and
ii) h1 is logarithmic and h2 is linear, making the inter-temporal utility function quasi-linear.
So far, we have implicitly assumed that public debt is repaid in both periods, such that
creditors have no reason to restrict lending to the government. We now consider default on
debt in period 2 through a willingness to pay constraint. A government honors the debt
contract only when the net benefit of defaulting is smaller than the net benefit of paying
back the debt. While the former is related to the size of the existing debt level, the latter
involves a loss of access to the international credit market. In this model the world ends after
period 2. Therefore, similar to Acharya & Rajan (2013) we take a shortcut for modeling the
10We ignore the possibility of bailouts, which have been relevant in the financial crises in some cases, but
go beyond the scope of this paper.
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loss of access to the credit market. We assume that a default in period 2 causes a utility loss
of size z in this period, representing the discounted value from being unable to borrow in the
future. We denote the government’s default decision with the binary variable κi = {0, 1},
where 0 stands for no default and 1 for default. Then the period 2 utility in jurisdiction i is
given by
ui2 = Ni2 + γ (τi2Ni2 − (1− κi) (1 + r) bi1)− κiz
We do not model the default decision on government debt regarding initial (legacy) debt
bi0 in period 1. This could be done in principle and would require an endogenous lending
decision in period 0 but is not within the scope of our paper. Our focus is rather on the role
of exogenous legacy debt levels on fiscal competition. Legacy debt levels may accumulate
due to unforeseen shocks as in the European financial and economic crisis, or may play a role
when switching to a more decentralized federal system which also includes tax setting at the
jurisdictional level (as is considered in the reform debate on fiscal federalism in Germany).
Our assumption of repayment of legacy debt is reasonable if its size is small enough so that
default in period 1 is not attractive. Even if a government default was attractive in period
1, it would not occur in equilibrium since creditors would not have given any loans in the
first place.11
2.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium definition has two components. The economic equilibrium is straightforward
as this refers only to the location decision of firms. There is no linkage across periods because
relocation costs for firms are zero. An economic equilibrium in period t = 1, 2 is a location
for each firm for given levels of taxes and infrastructure in that period so that the net return
to investment is maximized. The economic equilibrium is fully characterized in Section 2.1.
The second component comprises the policy game between governments. We assume the
following timing of events. In period 1, governments decide simultaneously on how much
to invest (i.e. set mi), set new debt bi1, and choose the tax rate τi1, as well as, the public
good gi1, assuming that it pays back the legacy debt bi0. Then firms decide where to invest.
In period 2, governments simultaneously choose tax rate τi2, public good gi2, and decide on
the default of existing debt bi1. Subsequently, firms again make their location choices.
At all times we assume that governments observe all previous decisions. The timing of
moves implies that there is no commitment in the sense that period 2 variables cannot be
committed to in period 1. We consider a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium and solve the
model by backward induction.
11For completeness we have checked that there exists a set of sufficiently small initial debt levels that does
not lead to a default but still influences the subsequent choice of fiscal instruments.
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3 Results
3.1 Period 2
We begin with analyzing the government decision making in period 2. At that stage, a
government decides on its tax rate, public consumption good level and default, taking as
given the policy choices of period 1, that is, the debt levels bi1 and the public infrastructure
mi in both jurisdictions i = 1, 2. A period 2 Nash equilibrium is a vector of tax rates,
public good levels and default decisions such that each government maximizes its period 2
sub-utility taking the other government’s fiscal policy decisions in that period as given.
We consider the maximization problem of government i in period 2 and insert the budget
constraint for period 2 into the sub-utility function. We implicitly assume that the level
of public good provision is strictly positive and verify later that this is indeed the case.
Government i maximizes period 2 utility as given by equation (6) by choosing its tax rate,
where Ni2 is given by (2) adding appropriate time subscripts. The first order condition is
given by
U iτi2 :=
∂U i
∂τi2
= h′2
∂ (Ni2 (1 + γτi2))
∂τi2
= 0. (7)
For the within period 2 decision the outer utility function h2 can be ignored (as long as
h′2 > 0, which we assume). Solving the system of two equations with two unknowns given
by condition (7) we obtain τi2 = ν + ρ∆qi23 − 1γ .12 Note that ∆qi2 = ∆qi2 (mi,mj) =
4q¯i (1− δ)+4mi is a linear function of the inter-jurisdictional differences in existing public
infrastructure 4q¯i = q¯i − q¯j and additional investment in public infrastructure 4mi =
mi−mj . Inserting these candidate tax rates into (2) we find the marginal firm to be of type
α˜ = 12 − ρ∆qi26ν , from which we can derive the number of firms Ni2 = 12 + ρ∆qi26ν .
We now analyze the default decision in period 2. For this purpose we need to compare
the utilities under default and under no default. A government’s fiscal decisions other than
debt repayment (tax and public good) could depend on the default decision. However, if
we let the cost and benefit of default enter additively, the linear structure of the within
period utility function cuts this link as long as the public consumption good is non-negative
regardless of the default decision. The comparison of the two utility levels for given fiscal
policy decisions in both jurisdictions defines a willingness-to-pay threshold bwtp at which the
government is indifferent:
ui2 (κi = 1) = ui2 (κi = 0)⇔Ni2 + γNi2τi2 − z = Ni2 + γ
(
Ni2τi2 − bwtp (1 + r)
)
⇔bwtp = z
γ (1 + r)
.
If bi1 > bwtp, a jurisdiction does not repay its debt as the benefits from default outweigh
12The second order condition is fulfilled because Ni2 is a linear function of tax rates and depends negatively
on the own tax rate.
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the related costs, and vice versa. An interesting point to note is that the default decision
in jurisdiction i does not depend on the default decision in jurisdiction j, as long as the
condition gi ≥ 0 is not binding. Furthermore, bwtp is identical across jurisdictions because
they face the same z. Heterogeneous utility losses of default would imply heterogeneous
willingness-to-pay thresholds, an asymmetry which we address further below.
So far we assumed that the level of the public consumption good is non-negative and
maximized period 2 sub-utility with respect to the tax rate. We now review when this
is indeed a legitimate approach. Assuming an interior solution for gi2, tax revenues in
jurisdiction i in period 2 are given by τi2Ni2, which we derived above. In case of no default
we need to subtract the amount (1 + r) bi1 from tax revenues to obtain gi2. Bearing in mind
the maximum bi1 consistent with no default, we obtain the constraint zγ > τ
∗
i2N
∗
i2. As the
right hand side is not a function of the loss of default, a sufficiently large value of z ensures
that this condition is met, an assumption that we make in the following. We summarize our
results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. Let 2 > γν > 1. For given public infrastructure investment levels (m1,m2)
and borrowing in period 1 (bi1), there exists a unique Nash equilibrium for the period 2 fiscal
policy game with
τ∗i2 (mi,mj) = ν +
ρ∆qi2
3
− 1
γ
,
κ∗i (bi1) =
0 if bi1 ≤ bwtp1 if bi1 > bwtp
g∗i2 (mi,mj , bi1) = τ
∗
i2N
∗
i2 − (1− κ∗)(1 + r)bi1,
and the number of firms in i given by N∗i2 (mi,mj) = Ni2 =
1
2 +
ρ∆qi2
6ν where ∆qi2 =
4q¯i (1− δ) +4mi.
Proposition 1 has several interesting implications. First, the equilibrium tax rate of
jurisdiction i increases with the value of the gross location benefit ν, the own investment in
infrastructure mi and the marginal benefit of the public good γ, while the tax rate decreases
in infrastructure spending by the other government mj . Better infrastructure provides more
benefits to firms that are partially taxed. The tax rate is positive if ν is sufficiently large.
Moreover, divergence in tax rates stems solely from differences in public infrastructure,
4qi2. Second, the average tax rate across jurisdictions τ¯2 = τ
∗
12+τ
∗
22
2 = ν − 1γ is independent
of (mi,mj), as the terms involving public infrastructure offset each other, but decreases when
the general location benefit ν declines, making firms more sensitive to policy differences.
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3.2 Period 1
When analyzing the Nash equilibrium in period 1, we first put our focus on asymmetries in
initial public debt levels and derive the main results. We thus abstract from any additional,
potentially confounding asymmetries and assume that jurisdictions only differ in bi0 and are
identical otherwise. In particular, we let initial levels of public infrastructure be symmetric
(q¯i = q¯j). In a second step, we relax this assumption allowing for an asymmetric stock of
public infrastructure in period 1 as well as for a link between bi0 and qi0.
Beginning with the second stage of period 1 we note that firms choose their location
similarly to period 2 because a firm’s location decision is reversible between periods at no
cost. In the first stage of period 1 where fiscal policy is determined, the governments face
a potential constraint pertaining to additional borrowing.13 Proposition 1 shows that a
government defaults when its debt level exceeds bwtp. Therefore, no lender will give loans
above this threshold. We thus have an upper limit on borrowing in the form of a willingness-
to-pay condition which is defined as follows.
Condition 1 (Willingness-to-pay Condition). bi1 ≤ bwtp= zγ(1+r) .
The advantage of Condition 1 is its simplicity as it does not depend on earlier public
investment decisions or the level of existing debt. The government budget constraint for
period 2 is therefore as in equation (4).
Let us denote by bdesi1 the desired level of borrowing in period 1 if the default problem in
period 2 is ignored. If utility is strictly concave in bi1, and assuming an interior level of the
public consumption good, the optimal period 1 debt is given by
b∗i1 = min
{
bdesi1 , b
wtp
}
.
If Condition 1 is not binding, that is bdesi1 < bwtp, the government chooses its desired bor-
rowing level. On the other hand, if Condition 1 is binding, governments choose b∗i1 = bwtp
because, if utility is strictly concave in bi1, relaxing this constraint improves welfare ceteris
paribus.
We now consider two separate cases. First, we assume that the willingness-to-pay condi-
tion is not binding in either of the jurisdictions. The assumption is correct if, for example,
the cost of punishment (z) in the form of a loss of access to credit and thus bwtp is very large,
so that b∗i1 = bdesi1 < bwtp. In this case we can derive and use the first order conditions for all
fiscal variables in period 1, taking into account the variables’ impact on period 2 equilibrium
values. In a second step, we turn to the case where in at least one of the two jurisdictions
Condition 1 is binding, perhaps even in both, that is b∗i1 = bwtp. A government’s set of first
order conditions is reduced by one if the jurisdiction is constrained in its borrowing (or more
precisely, the first order condition for bi1 does not hold with equality). We show that the
implications from changes in legacy debt depend on whether Condition 1 is binding or not.
13As explained earlier we assume that default on debt from period 0 is not an issue because legacy debt
is sufficiently small.
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Case I: Willingness-to-pay Condition is not binding in both jurisdictions
After inserting budget constraints, government i solves the following maximization problem
max
τi1,mi,bi1
U i = h1 (Ni1 + γ (τi1Ni1 − c− (1 + r) bi0 + bi1)) (8)
+ βh2 (N
∗
i2 + γ (τ
∗
i2N
∗
i2 − (1 + r) bi1))
subject to gi1 ≥ 0 and mi ≥ 0. The values for period 2 (τ∗i2, κ∗, N∗i2) are given in Propo-
sition 1 and are correctly anticipated. Condition 1 ensures that debt contracts are always
honored, as shown in expression (8). We again must make sure that the level of public
good consumption in period 1, gi1, is non-negative, which we check later. The first order
conditions for i = 1, 2 are
U iτi1 :=
∂U i
∂τi1
= h′1
∂ (Ni1 (1 + γτi1))
∂τi1
= 0, (9)
U imi :=
∂U i
∂mi1
= −h′1γc′ + βh′2
∂ (Ni2 (1 + γτi2))
∂mi
= 0, (10)
U ibi1 :=
∂U i
∂bi1
= γh′1 − βγ(1 + r)h′2 = h′1 − h′2 = 0, (11)
where h′1 and h′2 are the derivatives of the functions h1 and h2. In first order condition
(11) we made use of the assumption β = 11+r . The second order conditions are fulfilled if
the cost function for infrastructure investment is sufficiently convex and h1 is sufficiently
concave to make the allocation of resources in both periods optimal. We derive the full set
of second order conditions in the Appendix. Note that U i is strictly concave in bi1, as long
as at least one of the two functions h1 or h2 is strictly concave.
We solve the system of six first order conditions (three for each jurisdiction) as follows:
Assuming that public consumption good levels are strictly positive, the first order conditions
for tax rates (9) for both jurisdictions are independent of infrastructure investment as well
as debt levels, and can be solved separately. We solve for the tax rates in a similar way as
above in period 1, yielding
τ∗i1 = ν −
1
γ
, N∗i1 =
1
2
. (12)
Since by assumption the public infrastructure differential is zero in period 1, the tax base is
split in half between the two jurisdictions. As in period 2, the more footloose firms are (i.e.
the lower ν), the lower are equilibrium tax rates. This corresponds to the standard result
that increasing capital mobility drives down equilibrium tax rates.
Using the first order condition for period 1 borrowing (11), h′1 = h′2, we can simplify the
condition for optimal infrastructure investment (10) to ∂(βN
∗
i2(1+γτ
∗
i2))
∂mi
= γc′. We use period
2 equilibrium values to obtain
12
c′(mi) =
βρ
3
(
1 +
ρ4mi
3ν
)
. (13)
A symmetric equilibrium mi = mj = m∗ always exists and in that case the condition
is reduced to c′(m∗) = βρ3 . The symmetric equilibrium is unique if the cost function for
public infrastructure c is quadratic because the first order conditions are linear. Asymmetric
equilibria may exist though.14 An interesting property of (13) is that it is independent of
the initial debt level. Thus, the choice of mi is not affected by bi0.
The combined results from the first order conditions for taxes and infrastructure spending
can now be used to determine the optimal borrowing level, as all other variables entering
the arguments of h1 and h2 are determined via (10) and (11). For example, when the
functions h1 and h2 are identical and the infrastructure spending as well as existing public
infrastructure in period 1 are symmetric (mi = mj , q¯i = q¯j), the first order condition implies
Ni1 = Ni2 and gi1 = gi2, which in turn leads to bdesi1 = (1 + r) bi0 +
c
2+r . Interestingly, the
desired level of borrowing in period 1 does not need to be the same across jurisdictions if
initial debt levels differ. Still an equilibrium with symmetric infrastructure investment is
maintained, as long as Condition 1 is not binding. Alternatively, when the inter-temporal
utility function is quasi-linear (with h1 (x) = ln (x) and h′′2 = 0) the desired borrowing level
is bdesi1 =
1
γ − ν2 + c+ (1 + r) bi0, assuming again symmetric public infrastructure levels.
We finally need to check whether public consumption good levels are positive. This can
be guaranteed by making appropriate assumptions on parameter values. For example, in
the quasi-linear case, we obtain together with condition (11) that gi1 = 12γ > 0, so that
the non-negativity constraint is always fulfilled. In the case of identical h functions and
symmetric infrastructure spending, gi1 = gi2 = 12
(
ν − 1γ
)
− (1 + r)
(
(1 + r) bi0 +
c
2+r
)
,
which is positive for sufficiently large levels of ν and small enough values for initial debt and
cost of infrastructure. We summarize our findings in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. Let 2 > γν > 1. Assume Condition 1 is not binding in both jurisdictions
and initial public infrastructure levels are symmetric q¯i = q¯j.
a) A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with symmetric infrastructure spending exists, in
which tax is τ∗i1 = ν − 1γ and infrastructure spending and first period borrowing are
implicitly given by c′(m∗) = βρ3 and condition (11), respectively.
b) A change in a jurisdiction’s legacy debt (bi0) does not affect fiscal competition (tax
rates and public infrastructure) and thus leaves firm location decisions in both periods
unaffected. An increase in one jurisdiction’s legacy debt affects its period 1 borrowing
and its period 2 public consumption.
c) A decrease in ν (i.e. firms become more footloose) lowers tax rates in both periods.
14For example, a corner solution with one jurisdiction not investing at all exists if c (mi) =
m2i
2
and
2βρ2 > 9ν > βρ2. The first inequality ensures that one jurisdiction cannot benefit from infrastructure
investment, while the second inequality makes sure that the jurisdiction finds a positive level of infrastructure
m∗i =
3βρν
9ν−βρ2 optimal.
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When governments can choose their desired borrowing level, the initial debt levels have
no effect on fiscal competition in taxes and additional public infrastructure spending. The
unconstrained decision on period 1 debt leads to equalization of marginal utilities across
periods. The infrastructure spending decision then equalizes the benefits and costs from
induced changes in public good consumption in periods 1 and 2. The result can be viewed
as a neutrality theorem with respect to inter-temporal aspects of fiscal competition,15 which
may explain why the existing literature has not much addressed the link between fiscal com-
petition and public legacy debt. We show below that endogenous constraints on borrowing
change our conclusion.
Case IIa: Willingness-to-pay Condition is binding in both jurisdictions
We now turn to the case where Condition 1 is binding in at least one of the two jurisdictions.
In this situation a jurisdiction would like to run a higher debt level than lenders are willing
to provide, as the latter correctly anticipate the default problem in period 2. Conceptually
it is easier to start with the case in which Condition 1 is binding in both jurisdictions. Later
we consider an asymmetric situation, in which only one jurisdiction is constrained.
The desired level of borrowing in period 1 is now higher than the willingness-to-pay
threshold, bdesi1 > bwtp. In equilibrium, the first order condition for period 1 debt (11) does
not hold with equality. Instead the optimal borrowing level equals the maximum feasible
level given by bwtp due to the strict concavity of U i with respect to bi1. Condition (9) still
holds and together for both jurisdictions the two conditions determine the Nash tax rates in
period 1, which are identical to Case I: tax rates are the same and firms split evenly between
the two jurisdictions. As before, we assume that the level of public consumption good is
positive and thus an interior solution is obtained. In this case legacy debt does not affect
period 1 taxes.
We are left with the two jurisdictions’ first order conditions for public infrastructure
investment (10). The absence of condition (11), however, now implies that the marginal
utilities in periods 1 and 2 are not equalized, that is, one may have h′1 6= h′2. In particular,
h′1 in (10) depends on the period 1 debt level and the level of infrastructure investment.
This is the key difference to Case I.
Even with the solution for tax rates in period 1 from condition (9), we cannot solve
explicitly for public investment levels, as the two conditions are nonlinear functions of mi
and mj . We examine comparative statics by totally differentiating the first order conditions
for public infrastructure. This is a legitimate approach when we have an interior solution
for the public consumption good and the tax rates for period 1 are determined in isolation
from the other relevant first order conditions. The sign of the comparative static effects can
be (partially) determined when we assume that the Nash equilibrium is stable, as suggested
15Note that we abstract from inefficiencies in the public good provision and thus ignore the intra-period
transmission channel highlighted by Jensen & Toma (1991) to focus on the inter-temporal effect of initial
public debt.
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by Dixit (1986). In this case the sign of the own second order derivative regarding infras-
tructure spending is negative, U i
′
mi < 0, and importantly, the direct effects dominate the
indirect effects, that is U i
′
miU
j′
mj > U
j′
miU
i′
mj where U
i′
x =
∂Ui
∂mi∂x
. A detailed derivation of the
comparative statics is relegated to the Appendix. Making use of the Dixit (1986) stability
assumptions we obtain
dmi
dbi0
= − 1
∆
U j
′
mjU
i′
bi0 < 0, (14)
dmj
dbi0
=
1
∆
U j
′
miU
i′
bi0 R 0, (15)
with ∆ = U i
′
miU
j′
mj − U j
′
miU
i′
mj > 0 and U
i′
bi0
= h′′1 (1 + r) γ
2c′ < 0. The latter inequality
means that the incentive to invest in infrastructure declines with higher legacy debt, as the
marginal utility of consumption rises when h′′1 < 0. An increase in legacy debt in i leads
unambiguously to a decline in infrastructure investment in i, as can be seen in expression
(14). Ideally, the additional legacy debt should be distributed across and repaid in both
periods to smooth consumption. Yet this cannot be done if the willingness-to-pay condition
is binding. The burden from the additional debt falls ceteris paribus on period 1 and raises
the marginal utility of consumption in period 1, thus making a transfer of resources from
period 2 to period 1 even more desirable. A second best government response to this problem
is to reduce investment in public infrastructure in that jurisdiction which by lower spending
in period 1 increases the space for public good consumption in that period.
The effect of i’s legacy debt on the infrastructure investment in the other jurisdiction is
less clear cut. The sign depends on the cross partial effect, U j
′
mj , which captures the change
in the net benefit of public infrastructure investment in one jurisdiction if the government
in the other jurisdiction invests more (or less). The sign defines also whether the two
jurisdictions’ levels of infrastructure spending are strategic substitutes or complements. We
can derive an unambiguous effect if we assume that the inter-temporal utility function is of
the quasi-linear type, that is, h′′2 = 0. In this case the cross effect U j
′
mi is negative and the
overall effect on mj is positive. Infrastructure investments are strategic substitutes16 and
move in opposite directions when one jurisdiction’s legacy debt rises.
The case of diverging trends in infrastructure investment carries implications for the
period 2 tax equilibrium. In particular, starting from a symmetric situation (with equal
initial debts) and symmetric infrastructure investments, an increase in a jurisdiction’s initial
debt leads to a lower tax rate for that jurisdiction in period 2, while the opposite holds in
the other jurisdiction. The latter can now afford a higher tax because the better relative
standing in public infrastructure partially offsets higher taxes. In other words, legacy debt
affects fiscal competition when a government is constrained in borrowing.
As in the case with no restriction on public borrowing, higher capital mobility, captured
16This a standard feature in fiscal competition models (e.g. Hindriks et al., 2008). For a discussion on the
role of public inputs in fiscal competition see Matsumoto (1998).
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by a decrease in ν, generally has a decreasing effect on equilibrium tax rates. In addition to
this direct effect, a binding constraint on public borrowing in period 1 introduces a second
impact of capital mobility. By affecting the level of tax rates in period 1, ν changes U i
′
bi0
.
In particular,
dUi
′
bi0
dν = h
′′′
1 (1 + r) γ
3c′ is positive if and only if h′′′1 > 0. The latter property
holds for a range of strictly concave functions, including the logarithmic form used above.
Since U i
′
bi0
< 0, the property implies that a higher degree of capital mobility reinforces
the depleting effect of legacy debt on public infrastructure investment and period 2 tax
rates. Intuitively, higher capital mobility in period 1 reduces the government’s revenue from
taxing capital, making it more sensitive to additional burden in period 1 such as initial debt
consolidation. In an environment with high capital mobility, governments with high legacy
debt levels find it even less attractive to shift resources to the future by investing in public
infrastructure. Consequently, they also set even lower tax rates in period 2.
Case IIb: Willingness-to-pay Condition is binding in only one jurisdiction
The final case involves an asymmetry. One jurisdiction can freely choose bi1 whereas for the
other jurisdiction Condition 1 is binding. This could for example be the case if jurisdictions
face different levels of z. For instance, jurisdictions whose finances depend more on inter-
national credit markets can convince potential lenders more easily that they are willing to
repay the debt later to keep their access to the credit market. A similar situation can be
described for jurisdictions whose economy is more vulnerable to shocks following the default
decision.
For the equilibrium analysis, we need not specify exactly where the asymmetry comes
from. Let us assume that Condition 1 is binding in jurisdiction i, but not in j. Then, the
Nash equilibrium is characterized by five first order conditions17, two for i (w.r.t. mi and
τi) and three for j (w.r.t. mj , τj and bj1). The two first order conditions for the tax rates in
period 1 can still be solved separately. Furthermore, the condition for optimal borrowing in
jurisdiction j implies that gj1 = 12γ , as in Case I. However, in this case we cannot easily solve
the remaining first order conditions. Still, we now expect asymmetric spending on public
infrastructure and effects of initial debt level in jurisdiction i affecting its infrastructure
investment and thus period 2 equilibrium tax rates.
More formally, we can undertake comparative static analysis with respect to legacy debt
levels. Below we show that Case IIb can be treated as a combination of Cases I and IIa. We
thus relegate the technical details of this supplementary analysis to the Appendix and only
state the main results. First, an increase in legacy debt in jurisdiction i leads to opposite
effects on infrastructure investment in the two jurisdictions. Second, the effects of such an
increase on period 1 debt and infrastructure investment in the unconstrained jurisdiction go
in the same direction: the unconstrained jurisdiction spends more on public infrastructure
and borrows more at the same time. Finally, a change in legacy debt in jurisdiction j is
17After substituting the government budget constraint in period 1 into the objective function, as before.
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neutral, as in Case I. The unconstrained jurisdiction can still shift resources across periods
as it wishes to. Therefore the marginal cost of increasing public infrastructure spending in
period 1 depends only on the cost function c, but not on the level of borrowing. The main
insight from Case IIa carries over: An increase in legacy debt in a jurisdiction that faces
a binding constraint in public borrowing leads to a decrease in period 2 tax rates of this
jurisdiction.
We summarize the results from Cases IIa,b as follows:
Proposition 3. Let 2 > γν > 1. Assume that at least one jurisdiction is constrained in its
borrowing decision in period 1 (i.e., Condition 1 is binding) and initial public infrastructure
levels are symmetric q¯i = q¯j.
a) If Condition 1 is binding in both jurisdictions and the Nash equilibrium in infrastruc-
ture spending is stable, an increase in jurisdiction i’s legacy debt (bi0) leads to a decline
in infrastructure investment (mi) and also reduces i’s period 2 tax rate (τi2). Assuming
quasi-linear preferences it increases infrastructure spending in j (mj), and thus a rise
in j’s tax in period 2 (τj2).
b) If only one jurisdiction is constrained in borrowing, an increase in that jurisdiction’s
legacy debt affects infrastructure spending and tax rates in period 2. Changes in initial
debt of an unconstrained jurisdiction are neutral to the location game in period 2 and
leave period 2 tax rates and infrastructure investment unaffected.
c) A decrease in ν (i.e. firms become more footloose) lowers tax rates in both jurisdictions
in both periods. In addition, higher ν weakly increases the negative effect of legacy
debt on the public investment level and period 2 tax rates in a jurisdiction that faces a
binding borrowing constraint.
We need to make sure that public good consumption level in period 1 is indeed positive.
When Condition 1 is binding, gi1 > 0 ⇔ 12
(
ν − 1γ
)
− c + bwtp > (1 + r) bi0. A sufficiently
small initial level of debt is required to ensure the condition is met. This requirement results
from the initial debt being an exogenous burden on the public good consumption in period
1. Finally, 2 > γν > 1 ensures that τ∗i1, bdesi1 > 0.
It is interesting to put our main results in the context of the scarce literature on tax
competition and public debt. As noted in the introduction, Arcalean (2015) is close to but
different from our work. In his model government debt is always repaid. Financial liberal-
ization puts pressure on tax rates which in turn leads to more capital accumulation, which
can be taxed and brought forward through higher initial budget deficits. This incentive
works because the median voter, who by assumption is a worker with labor income only,
redistributes income through capital taxation to herself intratemporally and through debt
intertemporally. Our paper can be seen as complementary by emphasizing the role of initial
(legacy) debt and focusing on a different mechanism through investment in public infras-
tructure. Our results can also be related to Jensen & Toma (1991), who show that period
1 debt affects period 2 capital tax rates even in the absence of default. While the models
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are different in some other aspects, it appears that the linear within-period utility function
in our model drives this difference. This assumption is useful for our purposes in order to
clearly identify the role of default which we obtain by comparing the results from Case I
and Cases II, respectively.
3.3 Asymmetric Initial Public Infrastructure Levels
In our analysis above, we have assumed that an inter-jurisdictional difference in the level of
legacy debt is the only source of asymmetry in period 1. We now allow for an additional
asymmetry, namely in initial infrastructure (q¯i 6= q¯j). We discuss how this affects our results,
summarizing our main findings below and relegating a more formal derivation to the Ap-
pendix. An asymmetric level of initial public infrastructure has several implications. First,
ceteris paribus it causes the better endowed and thus generally more attractive jurisdiction
to set higher taxes because the resulting loss in private investment projects is smaller than
in the jurisdiction with inferior infrastructure. This effect takes place in period 1, and also
in period 2 if public infrastructure does not fully depreciate (δ < 1). Second, the asym-
metric equilibria in the tax competition game in each period feed into the inter-temporal
fiscal variables. A higher level of public infrastructure attracts more private activity which
in turn raises the incentive for additional public infrastructure spending. This relates to
the polarization effect described by Cai & Treisman (2005). More public infrastructure in-
vestment also raises the level of desired public borrowing in period 1, bdesi1 , which increases
further because the better endowed jurisdiction shifts part of the benefits from a higher level
of period 2 tax revenue to period 1.
A higher level of existing public infrastructure thus improves a jurisdiction’s position
in the subsequent fiscal competition game. A particularly interesting case arises when the
initial asymmetry is related to legacy debt. To understand the consequences of such a
correlation let us suppose that the initial level of public infrastructure is a function of
legacy debt, q¯i = f (bi0). Intuitively, there are two forms in which such a relation may be
observed. For example, Poterba (1995) points out that the possibility of debt financing of
public investment spending can make it easier to obtain support for government investment
projects as they appear less costly to the public. Thus, if higher legacy debt levels are an
indicator of higher public infrastructure spending in the past, the relationship is positive,
that is, f ′ > 0. High legacy debt levels may, however, also result from a structural deficit in
the jurisdiction caused by public consumption spending. In this case, the level of existing
infrastructure may be negatively related to the observed legacy debt, and therefore f ′ < 0.
We now show that the sign of the relationship between initial levels of debt and infras-
tructure is key for understanding asymmetries in public infrastructure.
Proposition 4. Let existing public infrastructure be a continuously differentiable function
of legacy debt, q¯i = f (bi0), and initial debt be positively (negatively) related to initial public
infrastructure , f ′ > 0 (f ′ < 0). An increase in jurisdiction i’s legacy debt (bi0) leads to an
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increase (a decline) in infrastructure investment (mi) and also increases (reduces) i’s period
2 tax rate (τi2) if
a) Condition 1 is not binding in both jurisdictions (Case I), or
b) Condition 1 is binding in both jurisdictions (Case II), δ = 1 and the marginal decrease
(increase) in period 1 government revenue resulting from the lower (higher) level of
initial public infrastructure is greater than the marginal increase in the repayment
burden.
The formal argument is given in the Appendix. Here we discuss the results intuitively.
If legacy debt has no effect on inter-temporal redistribution (Case I), only the polarization
effect from public infrastructure spending is decisive. This implies in the case of unrestricted
public borrowing that the choice of mi is no longer independent of bi0, but indirectly linked
to it through q¯i. If higher legacy debt is associated with more public investment in the past,
then higher bi0 leads to more infrastructure spending in period 1. In contrast, if higher
initial debt in period 1 has to be attributed to high consumption spending, then higher bi0
implies a lower level of infrastructure spending in period 1.18
Inter-temporal considerations are relevant if public borrowing is restricted (Case II). In
addition to the polarization effect, the government’s incentive to redistribute between periods
is affected. To illustrate this point, assume that high legacy debt indicates a low level of
public infrastructure installments in the past. The jurisdiction with a higher initial debt
level faces a stronger incentive to redistribute resources to period 1 because the coinciding
lower level of existing public infrastructure implies less public revenue in period 1. As a
consequence it chooses a lower level of additional infrastructure spending and consequently
also taxes less. The opposite is the case if q¯i and bi0 are negatively related.
In general, even in the presence of an additional asymmetry resulting from the relation
of q¯i and bi0 it is still true that a higher repayment burden in period 1 incentivizes inter-
temporal redistribution either via additional borrowing or lower infrastructure spending.
The new effect from the additional asymmetry may, however, reinforce or mitigate the
incentive since a change in bi0 also changes q¯i. An interesting special case arises when public
infrastructure fully depreciates (δ = 1).19 As formalized in condition (A.12) in the Appendix,
higher bi0 increases public infrastructure spending in period 1 if the marginal increase in
government revenue resulting from the coinciding increase in initial public infrastructure is
greater than the resulting marginal increase in the repayment burden. This follows the simple
intuition that public debt does not become a structural problem as long as governments
use the additional funds to generate higher revenues in a later period (e.g. by effectively
improving public infrastructure).
18This result is formalized in condition (A.10) in the Appendix.
19This simplifies the exposition as it abstracts from any effect of initial public infrastructure in period 2.
19
3.4 Numerical Example
We complement our analysis with a numerical example that illustrates the working of the
model and allows to check the consistency of the solution derived above. We return to
the case of symmetric initial infrastructure levels (q¯i = q¯j) and assume the utility function
to be quasi-linear with h1 (x) = ln (x) and h2 (x) = x, and the investment cost function
to be quadratic, c (mi) = m2i . We set ρ = 1.4, ν = 1.4, γ = 1.3, δ = 1 and z = 0.25.
Furthermore, we let r = 0.01 such that β = 0.99 and assume q¯i = q¯j . The upper limit for
public borrowing in period 1 is then bwtp = 0.19. We solve the model using a simple iterative
algorithm. Solutions for the key variables are displayed in Table 1. The full set of variables
is presented in the Appendix.
Table 1: Numerical Solution
Case I Case IIa Case IIb
Jurisdiction 1 2 1 2 1 2
bi0 0.06 0.05 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.05
bdesi1 0.18 0.17 0.31 0.22 0.31 0.17
m∗i 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.23
τ∗i2 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.61 0.65
In the first two columns of Table 1 we present a solution for Case I. Initial debt levels are
very low such that the desired borrowing level in period 1 is below the willingness-to-pay
threshold and Condition 1 is not binding. As expected, public infrastructure investment and
period 2 tax rates are identical across jurisdictions. We proceed to Case IIa in the second
column where initial debt is set higher to generate a situation with a binding borrowing
constraint. Now we have an asymmetric solution for public investment and period 2 tax
rates: The jurisdiction with the higher level of legacy debt (jurisdiction 1) invests less and
sets lower taxes. Again, this follows the theoretical analysis from above. Finally, we set initial
debt levels such that we can demonstrate the outcome for Case IIb. In our example, the
initial debt level is high in jurisdiction 1, such that Condition 1 is binding there. Jurisdiction
2 has a lower level of legacy debt and does not face a binding constraint on borrowing in
the first period. Consequently, the constrained jurisdiction displays a lower level of public
investment and has a lower tax rate.20
20In the Appendix, we provide an additional solution in column Case IIb’ where we increase legacy debt in
jurisdiction 2 to demonstrate that this has no effect on equilibrium tax rates and investment since Condition
1 is not binding for jurisdiction 2.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have used a two-jurisdiction, two-period model to analyze a fiscal compe-
tition game with asymmetric initial public debt levels. We first show that, with unlimited
government borrowing, the level of legacy public debt does not affect the fiscal competition
game. Governments merely shift the repayment burden to future generations by increasing
additional borrowing one by one. We then allow for government default which endoge-
nously imposes an upper bound on public debt. This restricts inter-temporal redistribution
of governments and provides an important theoretical link between legacy debt and fiscal
competition.
We show that in the presence of restricted public borrowing the government’s decision on
long-term infrastructure investment is shaped by its desire to optimally allocate resources
between periods. A higher level of legacy debt causes the government to decrease public
investment in the first period, making the jurisdiction a less attractive location for private
investment in the following period. Governments partly compensate this disadvantage by
setting lower tax rates in the second period. In our two-jurisdiction model, the more indebted
jurisdiction (in terms of legacy debt), therefore, invests less and sets a lower tax on capital.
This mechanism is weakly stronger, the higher is the level of capital mobility. Capital
mobility, therefore, leads not only to downward pressure on tax rates, as is well known from
the literature, but tends to reinforce the effect of initial debt.
Besides developing a theoretical framework for the analysis of fiscal competition in the
presence of government debt levels, the theoretical results might be helpful in providing
clearer predictions for empirical analysis of fiscal competition. In particular, our findings
suggest a link between the heterogeneity of debt levels and the variation in taxes on mobile
tax bases. In the sense of Cai & Treisman (2005), debt levels constitute a potential source
of initial asymmetry that may induce an asymmetric equilibrium in the fiscal competition
game. In particular, larger differences in debt levels across jurisdictions are expected to lead
to tax divergence which is reinforced by greater capital mobility.
This result also provides important insights into current policy debates. For example,
in Germany the federal states (Länder) have little tax autonomy. Some policy makers and
many academics strongly support more tax autonomy for states (income tax, business tax).
Given that states differ widely in existing debt levels, it is not clear whether and how
existing debt would influence the competitiveness in a subsequent fiscal competition game.
Our model suggests that default on government debt might play a crucial role. If states gain
not only more tax autonomy, but also obtain more responsibility for ultimately balancing
their budget, initial debt levels matter.
On the other hand, inter-jurisdictional harmonization efforts in the area of business
taxation may prove difficult as long as there are great differences in public debt levels. The
problem is that jurisdictions with a high debt repayment burden may have very different
fiscal policy strategies than governments with a low level of consolidation requirement.
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We believe that our work contributes to clarifying the effect of government debt for
fiscal competition. While we consider our mechanism to be relevant, it is by no means the
only channel through which legacy debt may matter. In interesting complementary work,
Arcalean (2015) considers the link between tax competition and endogenous debt levels, both
as functions of the degree of financial liberalization. In contrast to his work, we emphasize
the role of default which appears to be relevant in many situations. Following our approach,
future work could consider the effects of bailouts when default occurs, or the effect of fiscal
rules that are currently in widespread. Both of these extensions would add more realism to
the analysis.
Throughout our analysis we have focused on the positive aspects of changes in capital
mobility and legacy debt. Normative issues are clearly relevant. However, the current model
is probably not ideal for welfare analysis. For example, the total number of firms is fixed
and thus independent of tax rates and public infrastructure. This appears quite special, but
the setup turns out to be tractable this way. Future works should also address the welfare
implications of fiscal competition when government debt matters.
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Appendix
Second Order Conditions for Case I
The Hessian for the system of first order conditions (9) to (11) is given by
H =

Umimi U
τi1
mi U
bi1
mi
Umiτi1 U
τi1
τi1 U
bi1
τi1
Umibi1 U
τi1
bi1
U bi1bi1
 =

Umimi 0 U
bi1
mi
0 Uτi1τi1 0
Umibi1 0 U
bi1
bi1

where Uxiy =
∂2Ui
∂xi∂y
. In the second term we have inserted the first order condition for taxes
(9) to verify Umiτi1 = −h′′1 ∂(Ni1(1+γτi1))∂τi1 γc′ = 0 and U bi1τi1 = γh′′1
∂(Ni1(1+γτi1))
∂τi1
= 0. For (9)-(11)
to yield a maximum, H must be negative definite. This is the case if and only if
Umimi = −h′′1 (γc′)
2 − h′1γc′′ + βh′′2
(
∂Ni2 (1 + γτi2)
∂mi
)2
+ βγh′2
∂Ni2
∂mi
∂τi2
∂mi
< 0, (A.1)
Umimi U
τi1
τi1 > 0, (A.2)
Uτi1τi1
(
Umimi U
bi1
bi1
− (U bi1mi )2) < 0. (A.3)
Condition (A.1) is fulfilled for any sufficiently convex public investment cost function c, i.e.
large enough c′′. Since Uτi1τi1 = −h′1 γν < 0, (A.2) must hold whenever (A.1) holds. Then, for
(A.3) to hold in conjunction with (A.1), we must have U bi1bi1 < 0 and a sufficiently convex
c such that Umimi U
bi1
bi1
>
(
U bi1mi
)2 where U bi1mi = −h′′1γ2c′ − γh′′2 (∂Ni2(1+γτi2)∂mi ). Note that
U bi1bi1 < 0⇐⇒ β >
h′′2
h′′1
which is always true in the quasi-linear case. More generally, h1 needs
to be sufficiently more concave than h2 in order to make it optimal to distribute resources
between the two periods rather than shifting all resources into period 2.
Comparative Statics for Case IIa
Taking the total differential of the first order conditions we arrive at the following system
of equations  U i
′
mi U
i′
mj
U j
′
mi U
j′
mj

 dmi
dmj
+
 U i
′
bi0
0
 dDio = 0
which can be rearranged to yield equations (14) and (15). Since U i
′
bi0
< 0, the Dixit (1986)
stability conditions,
U i
′
mi < 0, U
j′
mj < 0, U
i′
miU
j′
mj > U
j′
miU
i′
mj ,
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imply dmidbi0 < 0. If h
′′
2 = 0 such that U i is quasi-linear, we can show that
dmj
dbi0
< 0 by verifying
that in this case
U j
′
mi = −βh′′2
(
ρ
6ν
+
γρ
3
(
1
2ν
τi2 +Ni2
))2
− γρ
2
9ν
βh′2 = −
γρ2
9ν
βh′2 < 0.
Comparative Statics for Case IIb
We assume that Condition 1 is binding in i but not in j. Then the system of first order
conditions is given by
Uτi1 :=
∂U i
∂τi1
= h′1
∂ (Ni1 (1 + γτi1))
∂τi1
= 0 (A.4)
Uτj1 :=
∂U j
∂τj1
= h′1
∂ (Nj1 (1 + γτj1))
∂τj1
= 0 (A.5)
Umi :=
∂U i
∂mi1
= −h′1γc′ + βh′2
∂ (Ni2 (1 + γτi2))
∂mi
= 0 (A.6)
Umj :=
∂U j
∂mj1
= −h′1γc′ + βh′2
∂ (Nj2 (1 + γτj2))
∂mj
= 0 (A.7)
U bj1 :=
∂U j
∂bj1
= γh′1 − βγ(1 + r)h′2 = h′1 − h′2 = 0, (A.8)
The requirements for the second order conditions in each jurisdiction are identical to those
derived for Case I. The first order conditions for taxes, (A.4) and (A.5), yield again (12).
Substituting (A.8) into (A.7), we can rewrite the first order condition for public investment
in j to U˜ j
′
mj = −γc′ + β ∂(Nj2(1+γτj2))∂mj = 0. The Dixit (1986) stability conditions are then
written as
U i
′
mi < 0, U˜
j′
mj < 0, Ui,miU˜
j′
mj > U˜
j′
miU
i′
mj .
Taking the total differential of the first order conditions with respect to bi0 we arrive at the
following system of equations U i
′
mi U
i′
mj
U˜ j
′
mi U˜
j′
mj

 dmi
dmj
+
 U i
′
bi0
0
 dbi0 = 0
which can be rearranged to yield
dmi
dbi0
= − 1
∆˜
U˜ j
′
mjU
i′
bi0 < 0
dmj
dbi0
=
1
∆˜
U˜ j
′
miU
i′
bi0 > 0
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with ∆˜ = Ui,miU˜ j
′
mj − U˜ j
′
miU
i′
mj > 0. The second effect can be clearly signed because U˜
j′
mi =
β
∂(Nj2(1+γτj2))
∂mj∂mi
= −γρ29ν < 0. Taking the total differential of the first order conditions with
respect to bj0 we obtain U i
′
mi U
i′
mj
U˜ j
′
mi U˜
j′
mj

 dmi
dmj
+
 0
U˜ j
′
bj0
 dbj0 = 0
which we rearrange to
dmi
dbi0
=
1
∆˜
U˜ j
′
mj U˜
j′
bj0
= 0
dmj
dbi0
= − 1
∆˜
U˜ j
′
miU˜
j′
bj0
= 0
where the equality follows from U˜ j
′
bj0
= 0.
Asymmetries in Initial Public Infrastructure
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First we consider the situation where initial debt and
initial infrastructure are not related. After that we consider the relationship between the
two variables, both under unrestricted and restricted borrowing.
Exogenous q¯i For Case I, the first order conditions are given by (9), (10) and (11). (9)
can be solved to yield τ∗i1 = ν − 1γ + ρ4q¯i3 and, assuming a symmetric equilibrium for
public infrastructure spending, (10) reduces to c′ (m∗i ) =
βρ
3
(
1 + ρ3ν4q¯i (1− δ)
)
which is
independent of bi0. bdesi1 is derived by substituting these results into (11) and solving for bi1.
For example, in the case of log-linear preferences, this yields bdesi1 =
1
γ− ν2 + ρ4q¯i3
(
1 + ρ4q¯i6ν
)
+
c + (1 + r) bi0. For Cases IIa and IIb, the qualitative results of the comparative statics are
unaffected by letting q¯i 6= q¯j as long as we abstract from extreme cases of 4q¯i where private
investment is concentrated in one jurisdiction. This result is obtained because the signs of
the second derivatives of ∂U˜i∂mi with respect to mj ,mi, bi0 and bj0 are not affected by 4q¯i.
Linking q¯i and bi0 (Unrestricted Borrowing) Let q¯i = q¯i (bi0). (13) must then be
modified and reads
c′ (mi) =
βρ
3
(
1 +
ρ
3ν
4mi + ρ
3ν
4q¯i (1− δ)
)
. (A.9)
Taking the total differential of (A.9) with respect to mi and bi0 we obtain
dmi
dbi0
=
βρ2 (1− δ)
9νc′′ (mi)− βρ2
∂q¯i
∂bi0
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Assuming that second order conditions are met, we know that βρ
2(1−δ)
9νc′′(mi)−βρ2 > 0 holds, and
thus
dmi
dbi0
Q 0⇐⇒ ∂q¯i
∂bi0
Q 0 (A.10)
Linking q¯i and bi0 (Restricted Borrowing) Let q¯i = q¯i (bi0) and differentiate (A.6)
w.r.t bi0 to obtain
U i
′
bi0 =h
′′
1γc
′γ (1 + r)− h′′1γc′ (1 + γτi1)
∂Ni1
∂q¯i
q¯′i
+ β
(
h′′2
∂ (Ni2 (1 + γτi2))
∂q¯i
∂ (Ni2 (1 + γτi2))
∂mi
+ h′2
∂ (Ni2 (1 + γτi2))
∂mi∂q¯i
)
q¯′i
which, using (2) and the results from Proposition 1, can be rewritten to yield
U i
′
bi0
= h′′1γc
′γ (1 + r) +
(
ηb − ηc) q¯′i ≶ 0,
ηc = h′′1γc
′ (1 + γτi1) ρ2ν , η
b = β (1− δ)
(
h′′2
(
∂(Ni2(1+γτi2))
∂mi
)2
+ h′2
γρ2
9ν
)
.
(A.11)
The first term in (A.11) captures the effect of bi0 on the marginal utility of public infras-
tructure investment (U i
′
) that results from its impact on the incentives for inter-temporal
redistribution as described in Proposition 3. The second term
(
ηc + ηb
)
q¯′i represents the
change in U i
′
that is due to the variation in the cost of public investment ηc and the present
value of its benefit ηb , which is caused by a change in q¯i = q¯i (bi0). If the first term domi-
nates in magnitude, U i
′
bi0
< 0, and we obtain the same qualitative results derived in previous
sections above. To obtain further insights with regard to the second term, let us assume that
ηb − ηc > 0 such that more initial public infrastructure raises the marginal utility of public
investment. In our simple model the case ηb − ηc > 0 may arise when public infrastructure
depreciates fully between periods (δ = 1). In this case, we abstract from the effect of q¯i on
the benefits of public investment (ηb = 0) and focus on its strictly negative impact on the
related cost (ηc < 0).21
With ηb − ηc > 0, q¯′i < 0 =⇒ U i
′
bi0
< 0. On the contrary, if q¯′i > 0, the effect of initial
public debt may be reversed. In the particular case where δ = 1
U i
′
bi0 Q 0⇐⇒ (1 + γτi1)
ρ
2ν
q¯′i Q γ (1 + r) (A.12)
For more legacy debt to increase the marginal utility of public investment, the marginal
increase in government revenue resulting from the coinciding increase in initial public in-
frastructure must be greater than the resulting marginal increase in the repayment burden.
21This inequality follows from the concavity of the sub-utility functions.
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Numerical Example
Table A.1: Numerical Solution, Full Set of Variables
Case I Case IIa Case IIb Case IIb’
Jurisdiction 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Debt
bi0 0.06 0.05 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.06
bdesi1 0.18 0.17 0.31 0.22 0.31 0.17 0.31 0.18
bwtp 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Period 1
b∗i1 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.18
m∗i 0.23 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.23
τ∗i1 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63
N∗i1 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
g∗i1 0.38 0.38 0.27 0.35 0.27 0.38 0.27 0.38
Period 2
τ∗i2 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.61 0.65 0.61 0.65
N∗i2 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.51
g∗i2 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.15
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